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COMMENTARY 
THE DESEGREGATION DILEMMA: A VOTE FOR 
VOLUNTARISM 
FRANK I. GOODMAN* 
Professor Kurland's discussion of the Supreme Court's desegregation 
decisions is both elegant and incisive. In the main, I share his dissatis-
faction with the Court's performance in this area, but wish to add my 
thoughts on what the Court should have done- and yet should do-to 
resolve the painful dilemmas posed by the desegregation issue. 
I agree with Professor Kurland and, I believe, most other commenta-
tors that the opinion in Brown, as opposed to the decision, left a great 
deal to be desired. The Court said both too little and too much- not 
enough in elucidating the basic nature of the constitutional violation, 
but far more than it had any need or right to say about the empirical 
effects of school segregation on the hearts and minds of black children. 
The Court's "findings"-if that is not too formal a term-had little sup-
port from the authorities cited, and even today remain highly debatable 
despite a generation of research. These "findings," moreover, have fos-
tered unfortunate consequences. The Court's superficial treatment of 
the harmful impact of school segregation on the education of blacks 
was taken to have settled the question once and for all, foreclosing 
thorough consideration of the issue in later cases that, unlike Brown 
itself, truly hinged upon it. The emphasis on the detrimental educa-
tional and psychological effects of "segregation" also led some judges 
and commentators to conclude erroneously that the underlying consti-
tutional evil is racial imbalance per se, iather than its roots in official 
action intended to segregate. 
The deficiencies of the opinion in Brown, however, are of far less 
importance than the decision, which not only was correct, but surely 
deserves its place of honor among the Court's greatest contributions to 
a just society. The weaknesses of the opinion can be excused, at least in 
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part, by the political sensitivity of the issue and the Court's felt need for. 
unanimity. [ 
What disturbs me far more than the shortcomings of the Brown opinJ 
ion is the Court's failure in subsequent cases either to clarify the nature\ 
of the wrong or to fashion an appropriate remedy. The cases that chief- \ 
ly trouble me are the three decided in the "racial balancing" period \ 
between 1968 and 1972-Green,' Swann ,2 and Keyes. 3 In these deci-1 
sions, as Professor Kurland explained, the Court established the princi- ~ 
ple that a school district found guilty of de jure segregation must, by:j 
way of remedy, adopt a pupil assignment plan calculated to produce ai 
heterogeneous racial mix in as many schools as possible.4 "Maximum .\ 
feasible racial balance" (my term, not the Court's) became the order of 1 
the day. I have two principal criticisms of this remedial principle. 1 
First, the remedy does not fit the wrong as the Court defined it. Sec- i 
ond, the remedy implicitly rests upon controversial empirical premises : 
j 
concerning the educational and psychological effects of school racial j 
composition, which the Court scarcely bothered to mention, let alone 1 
defend. J 
If the Court had been prepared to hold that racial imbalance per se ~~ 
(de facto segregation) is unconstitutional, racial balancing clearly 
would have been an appropriate, perhaps the only appropriate, rem- 1 
edy. In fact, however, the Court defined the violation more narrowly . .] 
In the 1977 Dayton 5 case, it confirmed what most, but by no means all, ·i 
lower courts and commentators had assumed all along: school segrega- I 
tion, or racial imbalance, is unconstitutional only when generated by ~ 
racially motivated official action. Given this definition of the wrong, it -i 
is not self-evident that the remedy should be anything other than aban- ' 
donment of a racial assignment policy for a neutral one such as neigh- ~ 
borhood schools or freedom-of-choice. If a colorblind neighborhood i 
school policy, even though it produces nothing but one-race schools, is ~ 
-; 
constitutionally permissible in a school district not guilty of de jure vio- 1 
lations, then why should that policy be impermissible in a district ~ 
where such violations have occurred in the past but now have been 1 
~m~m& J 
l. Green v. County School Bd ., 391 U.S. 430 ( 1968). 
2. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd . of Educ., 402 U.S. l ( 1970). 
3. Keyes v. School Oist. No. l, 413 U.S. 189 ( 1973). 
4. See Kurland, " Brown v. Boa rd of Education Was the Beginning ," 1979 W AS H. U.L.Q. 
309, 358-66. 
5. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkma n, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), on remand, 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 
1978), a.lf'd , 99 S. Ct. 2971 ( 1979). 
i 
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The Court's answer to this question-less explicit, perhaps, than one 
. might have wished- was essentially this : The duty of a district court in 
; ·framing equitable relief is not merely to put an end to wrongdoing, but 
" ~ also to root out its vestigial consequences-to make the world what it 
would have been had the wrongdoing not occurred. The existing racial 
· distribution of students throughout a school system itself may be a ves-
tige of prior unconstitutional action. Yesterday's intentionally segrega-
tive laws and practices may have influenced family residential choices 
and contributed to the formation of today's one-race neighborhoods; 
hence today's one-race neighborhood schools. Significantly, the Court 
did not say that a school board's duty to eliminate vestigial racial im-
balance is contingent upon affirmative proof of the requisite causal re-
lationship on a case-by-case basis. Instead, with certain narrow 
exceptions, it treated that causal relationship as a virtually irrebuttable 
presumption; school boards would not be relieved of their remedial 
duty either by the plaintiffs' failure to prove or by their own ability to 
disprove the assumed causal relationship. 
The trouble with this theory-and my first criticism of the Court's 
approach to the remedial issue-is that the supposed causal linkage be-
tween past constitutional violations and current residential segregation 
not only was unsupported by any evidence before the Court at the time 
of these decisions, but also was intrinsically dubious. Residential seg-
regation is a universal phenomenon in American cities both in the 
North and the South. The main causes of one-race neighborhoods are 
poverty among blacks and discrimination by whites in the housing 
markets. School assignment policies could not have more than margin-
ally contributed to residential segregation, and even that is highly 
doubtfuL School segregation in the pre-Brown South actually may 
have moderated rather than intensified residential segregation by assur-
ing white families that they need not live in lily-white neighborhoods to 
maintain lily-white schools. Indeed, some demographic evidence sug-
gests that residential segregation prior to Brown was more acute in the 
North than in the South, but that this pattern has disappeared , if not 
been reversed, since Brown. 
I do not wish to overstate my skepticism on the issue of causation. It 
is true, as the Court suggested in Swann , that official decisions on the 
size and location of schools may sometimes shape the development of 
neighborhoods and their racial mix. It is also true that when a school 
board gerrymanders attendance areas, as the Denver school board did 
in Keyes, with a view toward preserving certain schools as white en-
-----------------------------------
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claves, white families elsewhere in the district, living perhaps in racially ' 
mixed attendance areas, may have an incentive to desert those areas so 
that their children can gain entry to the artificially maintained white 
schools. Although this scenario is not far-fetched, however, it is not so 
near-fetched that it warrants adoption without specific evidence in the 
particular case. In Keyes, for example, the record clearly shows that 
few, if any, whites did move into the part of the school district where de 
jure violations had occurred. 
In the mid-1970's the Court seemed for a time to be moving away 
from its previous approach to causation. Mil!tken v. Bradley6 held that 
desegration decrees embracing more than one district are proper only . 
upon an affirmative showing that the underlying violations have pro-
duced " interdistrict effects;" for example, that violations within a city 
system have contributed to the racial polarity between the city and sub-
urban districts. No longer was the Court simply willing to assume the 
critical causal relationship; it required specific proof. Three years later J 
l in Day ton I / the Court applied the proof-of-causation requirement to a 
single-district situation; it appeared that offending school boards would 
now be obliged to eliminate only those increments of racial imbalance 
that plaintiffs could prove to have been caused by unconstitutional offi-
cial acts and omissions. The hopes and fears aroused by Dayton I , 
however, were short-lived. Last term's decisions in Columbus8 and 
Dayton Ir reaffirmed the principles of Swann and Keyes and made 
clear that proof of purposeful segregation in a substantial part of a 
school district raises a strong presumption of systemwide segregative 
intent, systemwide segregative effects, or both; that the Court will view 
contrary evidence with the utmost skepticism. Indeed, even the most 
convincing demonstration that current racial imbalance in the system 
cannot be attributed to past unconstitutional action may not, under 
these decisions, relieve a school board of its systemwide desegregation 
duty if the district court finds that a dual system existed in the district 
as recently as 1954 and that the board took no steps to disestablish it. 
The issue of causation is more than a doctrinal quibble. To the ex-
tent that the supposed causal relationship between unconstitutional 
state action and current school racial imbalance is mythical, the de 
6. 41 8 U.S. 717 (1973), on remand, 540 F.2d 229 (6 th C ir . 1976), affd, 433 U.S. 267 ( 1977). 
7. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S 406 ( 1977), on remand, 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 
1978), affd, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979). 
8. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2982 ( 1979). 
9. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 297 1 ( 1979) 
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facto-de jure distinction, or the "maximum feasible desegregation" re-
quirement in the de jure case, can lead to massive disparity in the treat-
ment of similarly situated communities. Some school districts remain 
free to maintain systems of one-race neighborhood schools while other 
districts, in which de jure violations are found, become subject to bur-
densome and intensely unpopular busing requirements on the false 
premise that those violations caused or contributed to the existing ra-
cial makeup of the schools. The Court introduced a further anomaly 
through its holding that an offending school board is not responsible 
for correcting that racial imbalance which develops after a court-ap-
proved desegregation plan becomes operational. 10 Thus pre-decree 
and post-decree racial imbalance receive different treatment even 
though both stand in the same real relationship (or lack of it) to the 
underlying constitutional violation. 
In principle, at least, the proof-of-causation requirement in Dayton I 
would have eliminated the misfit between wrong and remedy and, 
along with it, the practical anomalies just described. It would have cre-
ated, however, new difficulties and anomalies of its own. If the 
Supreme Court had strictly enforced the causation requirement, district 
court judges would have found themselves ordering busing not on the 
basis of relevant educational or logistical considerations, but on the ba-
sis of inevitably speculative historical judgments about whether the ra-
cial composition of a particular school was traceable to prior 
constitutional violations. Busing orders thus might have been issued to 
some, but not all, schools within the same district. This visible and 
concrete disparity of treatment among children in the same district 
might have been worse than the more abstract disparity between dis-
tricts discussed earlier. 
These difficulties could have been avoided, of course, by a broader 
definition of the underlying constitutional violation. Had the Court 
been willing to hold that racial imbalance per se (de facto segregation) 
is unconstitutional, affirmative racial balancing would have been the 
inevitable remedy. My second objection to the Court's post-Brown de-
cisions, however, could not have been avoided in this way, because it 
simultaneously challenges the use of racial balancing as a constitu-
tional remedy and the notion that racial balance is a substantive consti-
tutional right. The problem is an empirical one-the absence after a 
10. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1970). 
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quarter-century of research of any solid evidence about the effects, if 
any, of a school's racial composition on the intellectual or psychologi-
cal development of children, especially minority children, who attend 
that school. The Court's hypothesis that black children lose self-esteem 
unless surrounded by a sufficient number of white classmates has not 
been substantiated. If anything, the weight of the evidence tips slightly, 
if inconclusively, toward the conclusion that the average black child 
has greater self-esteem in a predominantly black school than in a 
predominantly white one. 
Another prominent theory holds that a black child will do better aca-
demically in a majority white school either because he will absorb the 
middle-class academic values of his more advantaged white classmates 
or because his teachers will expect and demand more of him in that 
setting. Skeptics of this theory reply that a disadvantaged black child 
probably will not be influenced by his advantaged white peers with 
whom he has little in common; that he might instead be intimidated 
and discouraged by competition with these better prepared white stu-
dents; that what a white teacher expects academically of a black stu-
dent may not depend on the racial composition of the school or 
classroom. An enormous body of research has failed to resolve these 
issues. Countless studies have yielded conflicting, inconclusive, and 
methodologically dubious findings concerning the relationship between 
school-racial composition and student achievement. 
Other beneficial effects often attributed to desegregation in the public 
schools include more enlightened racial attitudes and a fairer distribu-
tion of educational dollars. None of these effects, however, even if sup-
ported by the evidence, affords an appropriate foundation for a 
constitutional requirement of racial balancing. To my knowledge, 
moreover, no court has adopted this view. 
The issue before the Court in Brown did not, as I have indicated, 
really depend on these empirical questions. The Court could have held 
purposeful racial segregation unconstitutional simply because it might 
be harmful or, simpler yet, because it deprived black children on racial 
grounds of the valuable opportunity to associate with whites. Court-
ordered racial balancing, however, requires a much stronger empirical 
premise. Even had the Court adopted the principle of strict constitu-
tional scrutiny for facially neutral laws that differentially affect minor-
ity groups, the principle would have no application to de facto school 
segregation in the absence of a finding that racial imbalance does, in 
fact, have a harmful impact on these groups. By the same token, a 
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decree that orders racial balancing to eliminate the consequences of 
prior de jure segregation presupposes that these consequences are 
harmful, that the harm will be cured or alleviated by the court-pre-
scribed remedy, and, perhaps, that the benefits of racial balancing will 
outweigh its obvious economic costs. Incredibly, ev::::-:. though the :-::cial 
balance decisions implicitly rest upon the premise of a truly substantial, 
even overriding, harm, the Court since Brown has not mentioned, let 
alone seriously addressed, these empirical questions. 
The Court's willingness to substitute its judgment for that of a school 
board on these complex and debatable issues of fact and value is an 
extremely questionable use of judicial power. Although I do not for a 
moment suggest that the Court should always adopt the legislative de-
termination of the social facts, it should make its own determination 
only with the utmost reluctance and on the basis of empirical evidence 
far stronger than any presented, or that could have been presented, in 
Brown. To argue, as some do, that a school board found to be in viola-
tion of the Constitution deserves no deference in fashioning the remedy 
would play havoc with traditional notions of federalism and separation 
of powers. The Supreme Court itself, quite understandably, never has 
relied upon this justification. 
Not much more persuasive is a more sophisticated argument that 
courts should not grant legislative judgments their usual presumption 
of constitutionality when they injure the vital interests of a racial mi-
nority, because of the danger that the preferences and welfare of the 
minority group have not been fairly weighed by the political process. 
Whatever merit this argument has in other settings, it deserves singu-
larly little attention in this one. Busing is not an issue that neatly di-
vides public opinion along racial lines. Opinion surveys consistently 
show that whites overwhelmingly oppose busing and that blacks 
equally split on the issue. Furthermore, my own impression is that the 
segment of the black community most strongly opposed to busing is the 
one most immediately affected- the parents of the children who stand 
to be bused. Clearly, therefore, busing would be soundly defeated even 
in a plebiscite in which blacks and whites, as groups, were given equal 
voting power; its unpopularity cannot be attributed solely to the politi-
cal weakness of the minority group. To defend court-ordered racial 
balancing, it is not enough to argue that the white majority is hostile or 
indifferent to the welfare of black children. One must also argue that 
black parents themselves either do not know or do not care what is 
good for their children. Paternalistic arguments, though always q ues-
1 
·l 
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tionable, are particularly dubious in this context where the available 
evidence suggests that the parents are at least as likely as the courts to 
be right. 
At this point, the reader may wonder just what I would have had the 
Court do about desegregation. Given the vagaries of the intent and 
causation requirements, what should the Court have done? Should it 
have refused to find segregative intent except in cases in which it was 
openly avowed or otherwise unmistakably evidenced? Should it have 
declined to trace the consequences of past discrimination and con-
tented itself with a requirement of color blindness in the future? The 
Court, I think, correctly rejected these timid options. I believe, how-
ever, that it should have been more receptive to desegregation plans 
founded on the concept of choice-plans, for example, that would offer 
black children the option to transfer from predominantly black schools 
to predominantly white schools, along with free transportation. This 
approach would have made biracial education available to those black 
families who wanted it without imposing it upon those, both black and 
white, who preferred neighborhood schools. 
A further consideration supports this approach. The educational ef-
fects of desegregation are not only highly uncertain in the aggregate, 
but also highly variable from person to person. Some black children 
will be helped, others hurt, and still others neither helped nor hurt by 
biracial education. No one can reliably estimate the relative propor-
tions of the three groups or identify in advance the members of each. 
My guess, however, is that a parent's willingness to choose integration 
for his or her child is a fairly good predictor of the child's capacity to 
benefit from the experience. On the basis of an informed judgment 
about the child's needs, abilities, and personality, parents who elect 
busing for their children probably will be more willing and better able 
than most to provide the necessary support and encouragement The 
converse is true with respect to parents who choose not to have their 
children bused. If I am right about this, it follows that the relatively 
small percentage of black children who ordinarily participate in volun-
tary busing plans derive benefits disproportionate to their numbers. On 
the other hand, plans that impose biracial education upon children 
whose parents would not spontaneously choose it may be doing many 
of those children a disservice. 
No one pretends that voluntary arrangements would substantially re-
duce overall racial imbalance or the number of all-black schools. Ex-
perience shows that most black families do not avail themselves of 
l 
-j 
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transfer options. In my view, however, this does not seem to be a deci-
sive objection. Constitutional rights belong to individuals, not groups, 
and few rights cannot be waived. 
Legitimate objections to freedom of choice do exist: the possibility of 
duress and intimidation; the one-sidedness of the burden placed upon 
black children to elect busing; the fear that the number of black chil-
dren who choose to be bused will be too few to provide one another 
with mutual comfort and support; and the concern that this fear may 
deter even those few from seeking biracial education. An adequate 
evaluation of these arguments would overextend my comments and the 
reader's patience. I conclude only with the observation that the path of 
voluntarism, despite its many potholes, seems to me, on balance, the 
wisest course to follow through the thicket of desegregation. 
